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GENE THERAPY’S FIELD OF DREAMS: IF YOU
BUILD IT, WILL WE PAY?*
LAURA HERCHER** & ANYA E.R. PRINCE***
Long overpromised and underdelivered, gene therapy has at last
achieved clinical validation and, with the advent of improved
gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR, seems poised to play
a rapidly expanding role in medical care. However, some of the
intrinsic qualities of gene therapy pose a unique challenge to our
health insurance model. Gene therapy is costly for a number of
reasons. It is “personalized medicine,” which means that
treatments are individualized and not for a broad audience.
Additionally, the goal of gene therapy is to provide a one-time
cure, so the cost is upfront and not spread over time as it would
be with conventional drugs or therapeutics. As our experience to
date illustrates, these issues of cost may adversely affect access. In
this Article, we argue that a lack of broad access to gene therapy
will deepen existing health inequities and may create a society of
genetic haves and have-nots, where certain genetic diseases
become something that happens only to those who cannot afford
treatment. This in turn may increase stigma and decrease
resources for affected individuals. For these reasons, the success
of gene therapy must be considered as inextricable from issues of
cost and coverage.
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INTRODUCTION
It’s amazing how many think [looming payment problems are]
in the future . . . . This is right now.1
The future is already here—it’s just not very evenly distributed.2
Gene-editing technologies bring the possibility of revolutionary
advancements in clinical care through gene therapy and the possibility
of realizing the long-imagined futuristic era of genomic medicine.
Gene-therapy and gene-editing treatments carry not just a
therapeutic goal but a curative goal—where patients’ symptoms are
effectively cured through genetic changes. Yet a major concern with
the introduction of gene editing into clinical care is whether access to
these treatments will be evenly distributed in a health-care system
that is by no means equitable. Lack of equitable access may result in a
society where some are able to cure their genetic conditions before
symptoms arise while others are “stuck” with curable genetic
diseases—leading to disparities, lack of resources, and stigmatization.

1. Gina Kolata, New Gene-Therapy Treatments Will Carry Whopping Price Tags,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/health/cost-genetherapy-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/NPR6-WBHB (dark archive)].
2. The Future Has Arrived—It’s Just Not Evenly Distributed Yet, QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR (Jan. 24, 2012), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/01/24/future-hasarrived/ [https://perma.cc/VMF7-BRLF].
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High costs and inequities of access are hardly unique to gene
therapy, but these new treatment models, wildly expensive and
resistant to economies of scale, threaten to bring the problem to a
new level with profound societal implications. As several recent genetherapy treatments entering the market illustrate, these procedures
have high price tags that challenge our current insurance system,
especially as more gene-editing treatments become available for use
and the number of patients seeking reimbursement grows.3 Although
high-cost treatments are not uncommon in our health-care system,
they are typically associated with treatments spread across months or
years. Gene-editing treatments are often posited as a one-time event
and as potential cures—meaning that companies providing these
treatments must seek to recoup all of their investment in one fell
swoop.4
The questions are (1) whether and how the U.S. health insurance
system will absorb the cost of these treatments, and (2) whether
access will be available to many in society.5 Alternative payment
structures have the potential to fulfill one or both of these goals—
lowering cost and increasing access. These goals are intertwined:
lowering cost is likely to increase access and increasing access may
lower cost. This Article argues that it is imperative that equitable
access remain a cornerstone consideration in any discussion of gene
therapy to avoid increased chasms between the haves and the havenots, the cured and those left without the ability to pay.
Providing access to gene therapy may well require innovative
approaches to pricing and reimbursement and may fundamentally
alter the practice of insuring health care. Various alternative payment
structures focus on different goals: some attempt to lower the overall
cost of the treatments, whereas others spread the cost of gene therapy
across time or broader risk pools.6 However, even if alternative
payment structures can be developed to successfully provide
reimbursement for gene-editing treatments, there is still no guarantee
this will equate to widespread access. Payment issues, such as high copays and other out-of-pocket costs, may be prohibitive for a
significant portion of society even when insurers provide coverage for
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Section II.B.
5. See Bradley J. Fikes, Wave of Effective—and Expensive—Cell and Gene Therapies
Challenges Health Insurers, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Oct. 4, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/biotech/sd-me-effective-expensive-celltherapies-20181004-story.html [https://perma.cc/ASC5-HSSV].
6. See infra Section III.B.
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the technology.7 Given the promise of cures for diseases, this prospect
paints a worrisome picture of rising inequality of care.
Our U.S. system of health care is rife with inequities of access.
While high costs and the inability to pay for treatment are hardly
problems unique to gene therapy, the promise of gene therapy to cure
genetic diseases threatens to widen the breadth of our society’s health
disparities and has the potential to decrease resources and social
support for those left behind. We argue that a variety of alternative
payment structures should be considered for gene-therapy
treatments, focusing particularly on increasing equitable access to
treatment both by increasing insurance coverage and by decreasing
costs.
It has not escaped our notice that this argument drives in the
direction of a single-payer system.8 A single-payer health-care system
would increase access to health care and therefore to approved gene
therapy treatments across the board, thus making access to these
technologies more equitable. It would also provide for greater
bargaining power with treatment developers to employ various
alternative payment structures.9 Indeed, the more we understand
about the genetic causes of disease, the more a universal health-care
system seems to make sense.10 The single-payer system, however, is
by no means the “panacea” to the problems of cost identified here.11
A focus on access that ignores the overall heightened cost of genetherapy treatments will threaten to bankrupt the system or drastically
overspend limited government resources. Access, however, should
not be forgotten as gene therapy is introduced into the market.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of
how gene-editing treatments have been introduced into clinical care,
including gene-editing treatments that use older technologies, as well

7. See infra Section III.C.
8. See, e.g., Grace Hampson et al., Gene Therapy: Evidence, Value and Affordability
in the US Health Care System, 7 J. COMP. EFFECTIVENESS RES. 15, 18 (2018) (noting the
difficulty of implementing alternative payment structures in a fragmented health-care
system).
9. See, e.g., Fikes, supra note 5 (noting that single-payer systems are able to consider
long-term benefits).
10. James P. Evans, Health Care in the Age of Genetic Medicine, 298 JAMA 2670,
2670–72 (2007) (“The potential success of genomic medicine provides a series of
additional compelling arguments to embrace a system of care that provides universal
coverage and broadly pools risk. It is no small irony that the emergence of individualized
medicine ultimately mandates a shared approach to health care delivery.”).
11. Id. at 2672.
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as the prospect of similar treatments utilizing CRISPR.12 Part II
discusses the primary cost drivers of gene-editing treatments—
namely, the limited market size of patients, the one-time nature of the
treatment, and the patent system. Each of these factors helps to raise
the cost of the treatments as companies must recoup their research
and development costs among a small number of patients likely only
paying for the procedure one time.
Given the potential strain on the insurance system, Part III
considers several alternative payment models that have been
proposed for reimbursement of gene-editing treatments. While some
of these may help ensure reimbursement for treatment, examples
illustrate that the implementation of the payment structures can
greatly affect both the success of the scheme and whether
reimbursement will be accessible across populations. Finally, Part IV
discusses how various elements of the U.S. health insurance system
may lead to inequitable access to reimbursement for gene-editing
treatments and, indeed, possibly to insurance itself.
I. GENE-EDITING TREATMENT AND EXPECTATIONS FOR CLINICAL
USE
Prospects for gene therapy have rebounded13 after a series of
high-profile disasters dashed the great hopes associated with the field
in the 1990s.14 Revitalized by improved viral and nonviral DNA
delivery systems,15 gene therapy has expanded in the twenty-first
12. This Article focuses on cost and access to gene-editing treatments. The two
common distinctions that arise when discussing gene editing are (1) whether changes will
affect only the patient (i.e., only their somatic cells) or whether changes will alter the
germline and may be passed down to potential future generations; and (2) whether the
editing is occurring for treatment or enhancement. While there are ethical concerns,
including issues of equitable access, to potential germline or enhancement gene editing,
the Article has a narrower focus on somatic treatment. Given scientific complexities and
ethical concerns, implementation of germline gene editing or enhancement in a clinical
setting is unlikely to emerge as quickly as somatic gene editing—which is already being
used in human clinical trials.
13. Samantha L. Ginn et al., Gene Therapy Clinical Trials Worldwide to 2017: An
Update, J. GENE MED., Mar. 9, 2018, at 1, 3.
14. See Jennifer Couzin & Jocelyn Kaiser, As Gelsinger Case Ends, Gene Therapy
Suffers Another Blow, 307 SCIENCE 1028, 1028 (2005); Tom Hollon, Researchers and
Regulators Reflect on First Gene Therapy Death, 6 NATURE MED. 6, 6 (2000); Jian Qiao,
Rosa Maria Diaz & Richard G. Vile, Success for Gene Therapy: Render unto Caesar That
Which Is Caesar’s, 5 GENOME BIOLOGY 237.1, 237.1 (2004); Barbara Sibbald, Death but
One Unintended Consequence of Gene-Therapy Trial, 164 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1612,
1612 (2001).
15. See Pieter R. Cullis & Michael J. Hope, Lipid Nanoparticle Systems for Enabling
Gene Therapies, 25 MOLECULAR THERAPY 1467, 1467 (2017) (discussing nonviral
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century to include work on five continents, although as of 2017, the
United States remains a driving force with over sixty-three percent of
all gene-therapy trials.16 Gene therapy hit a series of milestones in
2017, when treatments received Federal Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approval for use in the United States for the
first time: Kymriah by Novartis in August to treat acute lymphoblastic
leukemia,17 Yescarta by Kite Pharmaceuticals in October to treat Bcell lymphoma,18 and Luxturna by Spark Therapeutics in December
to treat a recessive form of retinal dystrophy stemming from the loss
of both copies of a single gene.19 There are significant technical
differences between the first two products and the last. The first two
are so-called CAR-T cell therapies that involve removing, isolating,
and manipulating the patient’s own T cells to provoke a specific
immune response and then returning these cells through an infusion.20
Luxturna, on the other hand, is delivered directly into the eye to alter
retinal cells in vivo.21 All three treatments fit the current FDA
definition of gene therapy as “a technique that modifies a person’s
genes to treat or cure disease.”22 All of these early entrants into the
delivery systems); Kenneth Lundstrom, Viral Vectors in Gene Therapy, DISEASES, May 21,
2018, at 1, 1 (discussing viral delivery systems).
16. Ginn et al., supra note 13, at 6.
17. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approval Brings First Gene Therapy to the United
States (Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Kymriah Press Release], https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm574058.htm
[https://perma.cc/3JGZ2MLY].
18. See generally Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation &
Research, & Wilson W. Bryan, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, to Rizwana
F. Sproule, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Kite Pharma, Inc. (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/CellularGeneTherapyProducts/A
pprovedProducts/UCM581259.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KSN-Q6XE]
(discussing
the
approval of a license for Yescarta by Kite Pharmaceuticals).
19. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Novel Gene Therapy to Treat Patients with
a Rare Form of Inherited Vision Loss (Dec. 19, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Luxturna Press
Release], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm589467.htm
[https://perma.cc/TMZ3-5FW2].
20. William F. Kaemmerer, How Will the Field of Gene Therapy Survive Its Success?,
3 BIOENGINEERING & TRANSLATIONAL MED. 166, 166 (2018).
21. Id.
22. What Is Gene Therapy?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
CellularGeneTherapyProducts/ucm573960.htm [https://perma.cc/X3JG-PLVR]. Others
have argued for a new definition of gene therapy that is broad enough to include CAR-T
treatment and applies to both in vivo and ex vivo treatments. See Jacob S. Sherkow,
Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, Is It ‘Gene Therapy’?, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, Aug. 23,
2018, at 1, 4. Kymriah, Yescarta and Luxturna utilize zinc-finger nucleases (“ZFNs”), as
do the treatments for MPS I and II for which Sangamo Therapeutics was recently granted
approval to begin human trials in Great Britain. ZFNs are enzymes that can be modified
and utilized to target specific genetic sequences and were the most commonly used geneediting technique prior to the development of CRISPR. In August 2018, Vertex
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gene-therapy marketplace were developed using older gene-editing
systems and not the revolutionary CRISPR technology.23
Improvements in the ease and efficiency with which we can edit
DNA using CRISPR have generated sky-high expectations for
breakthroughs in clinical care,24 expectations that have manifested
themselves materially as a thriving new market sector. According to
Forbes, there are now three publicly traded “CRISPR companies”
with a combined market capitalization of more than three billion
dollars.25 Each of the three tripled their stock price in the twelvemonth period leading up to June 201826—this to fund translational
research using the gene-editing technique that did not exist prior to
2012.
Many of the bold-faced names credited with the discovery of
CRISPR and the development of techniques for its use in organisms
more complicated than a bacterial cell, including human cells, have
become partners in commercial ventures to develop and bring to
market clinical applications of the technology. George Church and
Feng Zhang are scientific advisors and co-founders of Editas, which
received FDA approval in late 2018 for human trials of a treatment
for Leber congenital amaurosis, a genetic disorder that primarily
affects the eye.27 This would be the first in vivo use of a CRISPRderived medication.28 Editas also reports that it is conducting
preclinical studies of treatments for Duchenne muscular dystrophy,
cystic fibrosis, β-thalassemia and alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency.29
Pharmaceuticals and CRISPR Therapeutics opened enrollment in Germany in a study
combining phase 1 and phase 2 clinical trials for β-thalassemia; this will be the first-ever
human trial of a CRISPR-based gene therapy. Catherine Offord, US Companies Launch
CRISPR Clinical Trial, SCIENTIST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/newsopinion/us-companies-launch-crispr-clinical-trial-64746 [https://perma.cc/594F-MMJ4].
23. In-Young Jung & Jungmin Lee, Unleashing the Therapeutic Potential of CAR-T
Cell Therapy Using Gene-Editing Technologies, 41 MOLECULES & CELLS 717, 717, 721
(2018); Morgan L. Maeder et al., Development of a Gene-Editing Approach to Restore
Vision Loss in Leber Congenital Amaurosis Type 10, 25 NATURE MED. 229, 229 (2019).
24. Kaemmerer, supra note 20, at 166–67.
25. Robert Glatter, How CRISPR Gene Editing Is Revolutionizing Medicine and the
Companies Who Invest in It, FORBES (June 25, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/robertglatter/2018/06/25/how-crispr-gene-editing-is-revolutionizing-medicine-and-thecompanies-who-invest-in-it/#2a73f7b06f46 [https://perma.cc/MWF2-WZKQ].
26. Id.
27. See Editas Medicine, Inc., IPO BOUTIQUE, https://www.ipoboutique.com/
0605Advisories/EDIT.htm [https://perma.cc/QYB5-BC4Y].
28. Press Release, Editas Med. Inc., Editas Medicine Announces FDA Acceptance of
IND Application for EDIT-101 (Nov. 30, 2018), http://ir.editasmedicine.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/editas-medicine-announces-fda-acceptance-ind-application-edit
[https://perma.cc/BKP8-FXZF].
29. See Editas Medicine, Inc., supra note 27.
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Jennifer Doudna and Rodolphe Barrangou are co-founders and
scientific advisors at Intellia Therapeutics,30 which has touted its latestage preclinical work on gene therapy for sickle cell disease31 and has
a partnership with Regeneron aimed at developing a treatment for
transthyretin amyloidosis.32 Emmanuelle Charpentier is a founder
and Scientific Advisory Board member of CRISPR Therapeutics,33
which has been granted “Fast Track Designation” from the FDA for
human application of its sickle cell therapy.34 Like the β-thalassemia
study in Germany, these therapies will modify and return isolated
blood stem cells to the blood stream in an attempt to provide the cells
with a functioning hemoglobin gene that will compensate for the
defective version associated with both diseases.35
Overall, these trials illustrate progress in the development of
gene therapy, including therapies using CRISPR technologies, which
are likely to continue.36 As the next part discusses, several market
30. Leadership, INTELLIA THERAPEUTICS, https://www.intelliatx.com/overview/
leadership/ [https://perma.cc/8PSA-UEMS].
31. See Press Release, Intellia Therapeutics, Inc., Intellia Therapeutics Announces
New, Robust Genome Editing Data for Sickle Cell Disease at the American Society of
Hematology Meeting (Dec. 11, 2017), https://ir.intelliatx.com/news-releases/news-releasedetails/intellia-therapeutics-announces-new-robust-genome-editing-data-0 [https://perma.cc/
MQ8S-BLM4].
32. Press Release, Regeneron Pharm., Inc., Regeneron and Intellia Therapeutics
Announce Collaboration to Discover and Develop CRISPR/CAS Therapeutics (Apr. 11,
2016, 4:05 PM), https://newsroom.regeneron.com/news-releases/news-release-details/
regeneron-and-intellia-therapeutics-announce-collaboration [https://perma.cc/YJD7-C9EB].
33. Leadership: Dr. Emmanuelle Charpentier, CRISPR THERAPEUTICS,
http://www.crisprtx.com/about-us/leadership/dr-emmanuelle-charpentier [https://perma.cc/
VFR8-NMB6].
34. Press Release, CRISPR Therapeutics, CRISPR Therapeutics and Vertex
Announce FDA Fast Track Designation for CTX001 for the Treatment of Sickle Cell
Disease (Jan. 4, 2019), http://ir.crisprtx.com/node/8556/pdf [https://perma.cc/KQG5PBH3].
35. Offord, supra note 22.
36. Notwithstanding all this rapid progress, technical challenges persist that may
complicate the in vivo use of CRISPR technologies. See Carsten T. Charlesworth et al.,
Identification of Pre-Existing Adaptive Immunity to Cas9 Proteins in Humans, 25 NATURE
MED. 249, 249 (2019) (suggesting that a majority of people may harbor preexisting
antibodies to Cas9, an enzyme that plays an integral role in the most common version of
the CRISPR gene-editing system); Michael Kosicki, Kärt Tomberg & Allan Bradley,
Repair of Double-Strand Breaks Induced by CRISPR–Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and
Complex Rearrangements, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 765, 765 (2018) (reporting an
unexpectedly high number of problematic genetic changes, such as large deletions and
structural rearrangements, following the use of CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing in mouse cell
lines). Such challenges have reanimated concerns about gene therapy, causing
malignancies which have troubled the field from its earliest days. See Sam Sherratt, DNA
Damage from CRISPR ‘Seriously Underestimated’, BIONEWS (July 23, 2018),
https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_137304 [https://perma.cc/TA29-E5Y9]. For example, in
2002, an apparently successful trial of gene therapy for immunodeficiency was shut down
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forces drive costs of these treatments upwards. While increasing
utilization of gene-therapy treatments could be beneficial to targeted
patient populations, how the health-care system will absorb the cost
of the growing number of treatments is currently unclear.
II. GENE EDITING AND COST DRIVERS
As gene-editing treatments continue to rapidly gain regulatory
approval and be introduced into the clinical market, greater focus
must be given to the impact this will have on insurance and the
downstream implications for access to the treatments.37 The cost of
gene-editing therapies is likely to be a major barrier for many patients
in need of treatment and will create challenges for pharmaceutical
companies, payers, and patients. While most gene-editing treatments
are still in development or available only through clinical trials, the
handful of gene-therapy products that have received approval for
commercial use are illustrative of the ways in which gene therapy is
inherently an awkward fit for our current model of health-care
reimbursement. As discussed above, none of these approved
therapies use CRISPR, but while the gene-editing system may
change, the issues remain the same.38 Each of the therapies
introduced to date highlight specific challenges for gene-editing
treatments to come. An overarching theme is that high costs of the
treatments are likely to stretch the existing insurance reimbursement
when two of the eleven children treated became ill with leukemia. Donald B. Kohn,
Michel Sadelain & Joseph C. Glorioso, Occurrence of Leukemia Following Gene Therapy
of X-Linked SCID, 3 NATURE REVIEWS CANCER 477, 477 (2003); Charles Marwick, FDA
Halts Gene Therapy Trials After Leukaemia Case in France, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 181, 181
(2003). However, prevailing sentiment is that these are obstacles rather than roadblocks
and that workarounds or alternate strategies will emerge. See Expert Reaction to Study
Looking at Deletions and Rearrangements Due to the CRISPR/Cas9 Genome Editing
Technique, SCI. MEDIA CTR. (July 16, 2018), http://www.sciencemediacentre.org/expertreaction-to-study-looking-at-deletions-and-rearrangements-due-to-the-crispr-cas9-genomeediting-technique/ [https://perma.cc/LEZ8-E3PX]; Julianna LeMieux, Another “CRISPR
Calamity”? U.K. Team Reports CRISPR-Induced Gene Rearrangements, GEN (July 16,
2018), https://www.genengnews.com/gen-exclusives/another-crispr-calamity-uk-team-reportscrispr-induced-gene-rearrangements/77901116 [https://perma.cc/627F-SECF].
37. Incentives and the cost of research and development of preclinical care also
greatly impact the cost of gene-therapy treatments. Changes to innovation and regulatory
approval could have the potential to lower costs for society. For example, either changes
to how research is funded or a more streamlined regulatory process could potentially
lower research and development costs to companies—thus lowering costs to patients.
However, such policy recommendations are beyond the scope of this Article, which
focuses on how payers will address costs once introduced to market given that near-term
treatments are likely to continue to be expensive unless and until innovation policy
changes.
38. See infra Part II.
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system.39 These high costs are driven by: (1) market challenges for
pharmaceutical companies due to limited patient populations,40 (2)
one-time treatments,41 and (3) a patent system that purposefully
imposes monopolies into the market in order to allow pharmaceutical
companies to recoup their research and development costs.42
A. Restricted Market Size
Developing a drug for a small patient population requires a
higher price tag per treatment to recoup the cost and return value to
investors.43 As the prices are pushed upwards, the financial burden
may become prohibitive, leaving patients without recourse to
treatment. The small patient populations also make it difficult to
develop the clinical evidence necessary to fully understand and
document effectiveness44—an important consideration for payers
deciding what to reimburse.
For example, Glybera, developed by uniQure to treat the
ultrarare disease lipoprotein lipase (“LPL”) deficiency, was the first
gene therapy granted regulatory approval for the European market
and debuted in 2012 with a price tag of approximately one million
dollars per patient.45 The company argued that the high price tag was
justified by a limited patient population, but it also served to restrict
use of a drug already limited by a small potential audience. In fact,
the clinical trials sponsored by the company treated over ten percent

39. See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 1.
40. See infra Section II.A.
41. See infra Section II.B.
42. See infra Section II.C.
43. See GRACE MARSDEN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW & OFFICE
OF HEALTH ECON., GENE THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE, ASSESSING THE
EVIDENCE, AND PAYING FOR VALUE 26 (2017) [hereinafter ICER REPORT], https://icerreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICER-Gene-Therapy-White-Paper-030317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8QZQ-ZT77]; Stuart H. Orkin & Philip Reilly, Paying for Future
Success in Gene Therapy, 352 SCIENCE 1059, 1060 (2016). Of course, a treatment’s price is
not only based on the past research costs but also on willingness to pay and other
economic assessments. See David R. Carr & Steven E. Bradshaw, Gene Therapies: The
Challenge of Super-High-Cost Treatments and How to Pay for Them, 11 REGENERATIVE
MED. 381, 383 (2016).
44. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 18; Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 383.
45. Chris Morrison, $1-Million Price Tag Set for Glybera Gene Therapy, 33 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 217, 217 (2015).
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of the entire potential European patient population.46 Of the rest,
only a single patient went on to receive treatment.47
Having spent over 100 million dollars bringing the drug to
market, uniQure hoped to recoup its investment by expanding to the
United States, but when the FDA demanded further trials as well as
long-term follow-up, the company decided to cut its losses and
withdraw from FDA review.48 UniQure also allowed its European
approval to lapse in 2017.49 Though Glybera provided proof that gene
therapy could work and that regulators were open to approving its
use, the drug was a commercial failure.50
The problems that beset Glybera are not specific to LPL
deficiency. Cancer immunotherapy aside, the principal targets for
gene therapy to date have been Mendelian diseases—diseases where
a single gene is the target.51 Genetic diseases are individually rare if
collectively common, offering many potential targets for gene therapy
but few with blockbuster potential. Small audiences are the inherent
flip side of individualized treatment because the whole premise of
“individualizing” treatment is to make a smaller, more targeted
market. This obviously applies to rare and ultrarare diseases, but even
in the case of more common diseases, genetic medicine often targets
specific genetic changes that make up a subset of the disease or
specific disease mechanisms, limiting its effectiveness to a slice of the
affected population. Some recent targeted therapies from the drugdevelopment world illustrate this pattern. Ivacaftor, a breakthrough
medication for cystic fibrosis (“CF”), is an effective cure but only for
three to four percent of the CF population.52 The FDA approved
Eteplirsen for Duchenne muscular dystrophy in 2016 but only for
those with a specific genetic mutation, an estimated thirteen to
46. See Antonio Regalado, The World’s Most Expensive Medicine Is a Bust, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 4, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601165/the-worlds-mostexpensive-medicine-is-a-bust [https://perma.cc/S8CC-VSD3].
47. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 20; Ben Hirschler, Biotech Firm Pulls Pioneering
Gene Therapy Due to No Demand, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2017, 11:19 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-gene-therapy-uniqure/biotech-firm-pulls-pioneeringgene-therapy-due-to-no-demand-idUSKBN17M1WI [https://perma.cc/T2YN-CZZ7].
48. Regalado, supra note 46. There were also some questions as to the effectiveness of
the treatment, leading to the decision to withdraw. Id.
49. Press Release, uniQure, uniQure Announces It Will Not Seek Marketing
Authorization Renewal for Glybera in Europe (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.uniqure.com/
GL_PR_Glybera%20withdrawal_FINAL_PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYT8-T749].
50. Id.
51. Ginn et al., supra note 13, at 7.
52. Lisa B. Feng et al., Precision Medicine in Action: The Impact of Ivacaftor on Cystic
Fibrosis-Related Hospitalizations, 37 HEALTH AFF. 773, 773 (2018).
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fourteen percent of affected boys.53 These examples of a limited
audience are not exceptions but rather are the very nature of
personalized medicine.
The potential inability to recoup costs discourages
pharmaceutical companies from researching treatments for rare
diseases. Legislation has attempted to address some of the issues
surrounding rare disease development in the past. For example,
federal law incentivizes companies to develop pharmaceuticals for
rare diseases when it might not be financially feasible to invest in the
research and development costs.54 Yet this only solves part of the
problem, since the newly developed treatments can still be expensive.
Therefore, some have argued that a portion of these funds could be
diverted towards lowering the cost of the therapies for the patient.55
Over time, greater expertise may allow us to simplify the
development of therapeutics or the process of obtaining regulatory
approval, but for the foreseeable future, the costs involved with
bringing a treatment to market will remain formidable relative to the
potential audience. This suggests that prices will remain high and, in
some cases, prohibitive.
B.

One-Time Therapy Versus Lifetime Costs

The initial price tag for Kymriah, the first gene therapy approved
by the FDA,56 was $475,000.57 Although undeniably expensive, it
compares well with the cost of existing therapies in those cases where
it is either a cure or a long-term solution. This is, however, only true
where the therapy forestalls further treatment. When it does not, it is
a significant added expense.
In December 2017, four months after Kymriah was approved,
Luxturna became the third gene-therapy treatment approved by the
FDA and the first gene therapy approved to be administered directly
into a patient.58 Luxturna was approved as a treatment for an
inherited form of vision loss and blindness that affects between 1000
to 2000 patients in the United States.59 Luxturna is also expensive,

53. FADY SHAWI, CHRISTINE PERRAS & MELISSA SEVERN, CADTH, EMERGING
DRUGS FOR DUCHENNE MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY 4 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK476440/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK476440.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6CS-2SWX].
54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–360ee (2012).
55. Orkin & Reilly, supra note 43, at 1061.
56. FDA Kymriah Press Release, supra note 17.
57. Kolata, supra note 1.
58. FDA Luxturna Press Release, supra note 19.
59. Id.
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costing $850,000 per patient.60 Administered in two phases—one for
each eye at $425,000 each—the treatment is a one-time deal. Given
the lifetime costs of treatment and lost productivity related to
disability, Luxturna may or may not be a good investment; the
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review has argued that it is not.61
But even assuming that it is, the economic analysis necessitates that it
works as anticipated. Also, best-case scenario, Luxturna condenses a
lifetime of costs into one very expensive month. One-time treatment
is a common theme—and, indeed, often the raison d’etre—of genetherapy treatments. Gene-therapy treatments may drastically alter
our medical and reimbursement systems because they have the
potential to be one-time, curative treatments. However, for the same
reason, a pharmaceutical company must recover all of its per-person
investment in research, development, and cost of treatment from a
single payment rather than spread them over time, as in the typical
model of ongoing treatment or lifetime care. This will place a hefty
initial burden on all insurers and government payers and create
special challenges for most U.S. insurers, who have high rates of
turnover as customers change jobs or policies and thus cannot
amortize benefits of one-time cures over an extended period of time.62
Justification for the high prices of drugs like Kymriah and
Luxturna are often predicated on their value as a one-time treatment,
but this may not be a realistic expectation in all cases. Effectiveness
over a lifetime cannot be proven in advance since neither the
manufacturers nor their patients are willing to wait a generation to
test the hypothesis.63 In addition, approvals may be based on the
economics of the best-case scenario, but in reality, the therapies are
likely to be used more widely, including “off-label” use for patient
populations that are a less perfect match than those considered under
the regulatory process.64 Indeed, off-label uses of gene-therapy
treatments utilizing CRISPR have been anticipated. For instance, the
60. Bill Berkrot, Spark’s Price for Luxturna Blindness Gene Therapy Too High:
ICER, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sparkicer/sparks-price-for-luxturna-blindness-gene-therapy-too-high-icer-idUSKBN1F1298
[https://perma.cc/2DZM-BUEA].
61. See id.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 77–79.
63. See ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 18.
64. Off-label uses occur when a patient uses an FDA-approved treatment for a use
not approved by the Agency. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off
Label”,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/OffLabel/ucm20041767.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZSE8-Z2VP]. In this scenario, the gene therapy would be approved for
a specific patient population and the off-label use would expand the treatment to a
broader segment of society.
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National Academy of Sciences report on genome editing gives the
example of a treatment approved for adults that is expanded to a
pediatric patient population through off-label use, although it notes
that the extent of off-label use may be more limited than in the case
of pharmaceuticals.65
A potential problem with off-label uses from a reimbursement
perspective is that it shifts the economic model justifying the cost of
treatment. As the treatment is extended to other patient populations,
it may be less effective, yet it likely carries the same price tag. An
analogous example is the drug Kalydeco, which was developed as a
treatment for the five percent of CF patients with a specific mutation
in CFTR, the CF gene.66 The drug was effectively a cure in that
population67 but had limited effectiveness for other CF patients who
lacked this specific mutation. Nevertheless, many CF patients with
other mutations clamored to use the expensive therapy to obtain
whatever improvements in quality of life it afforded.68 Kalydeco,
which costs $311,000 per year, is not a one-time treatment.69 But, like
gene therapies, its high price tag is potentially justified by
effectiveness and by the savings it generates by eliminating the need
for more expensive ongoing therapy—a savings not seen when the
expected therapeutic value falls short of full recovery.
C.

Patents

Patents are another aspect of our medical system that can
potentially drive up costs. Patents are provided to ensure that the
research and development costs of a new treatment can be recouped
through a period of market monopolization.70 With companies
controlling patents for the newly developed treatments, there will
likely not be market competition to help bring down the cost of geneediting treatments in the near future. Additionally, lack of market
competition alters the motivations of the companies already holding
65. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE,
ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 105 (2017).
66. See Bonnie W. Ramsey et al., A CFTR Potentiator in Patients with Cystic Fibrosis
and the G551D Mutation, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1663, 1664 (2011).
67. See id. at 1663.
68. See Elie Dolgin, First ‘Breakthrough’ Drugs Designated, but Dilution Worries
Linger, 19 NATURE MED. 116, 116–17 (2013).
69. Joe Nocera, Opinion, The $300,000 Drug, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/opinion/joe-nocera-cystic-fibrosis-drug-price.html
[https://perma.cc/8YGN-DJWN].
70. Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Patents, and the Public Health, 90 YALE J. BIOLOGY
& MED. 667, 667–68 (2017).
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these patents, making them less willing to negotiate for the complex
alternative payment systems, described below, because these systems
will not give them an advantage over their (nonexistent)
competitors.71
The development costs for these new technologies is nothing to
sniff at. One article estimated that it will take eight years and several
hundred million dollars to develop a new gene therapy and obtain the
necessary regulatory approval.72 Additionally, the patents provide a
buffer for companies that can invest in a variety of potential
treatments in case some do not thrive, like Glybera.73 There are
ongoing patent fights over CRISPR technologies, but overall, the
potential therapeutic market is controlled by a couple of players that
have broad patents and are issuing surrogate licenses for other
companies to use the patented technology in a particular space.74
III. ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS
A. Payer Issues
The high cost of gene-therapy treatments challenges the
traditional U.S. reimbursement system. Although current medical
care is replete with examples of expensive treatments and
pharmaceuticals, gene-therapy treatments are somewhat unique in
their elevated, one-time costs. It is unclear whether insurers will cover
gene-therapy treatments across the board.75 Given the one-time high
cost, insurers may exclude coverage of gene-therapy treatments
altogether, or they may provide coverage for such technologies on a
case-by-case basis.76 There are several reasons why insurers are
disincentivized from providing coverage for such treatments.
First, insurance policyholders may change their insurance
coverage due to changes in employment, life situation, or geographic
location. For example, the current median length of stay with an

71. See Louis P. Garrison, Jr. et al., Private Sector Risk-Sharing Agreements in the
United States: Trends, Barriers, and Prospects, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 632, 632, 636
fig.2 (2015) [hereinafter Garrison et al., Private Sector].
72. Orkin & Reilly, supra note 43, at 1060. However, the authors of that article are
affiliated with the industry, and therefore other estimates of research and development
costs could conceivably be lower.
73. Sherkow, supra note 70, at 668.
74. Jorge Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific
Discovery, 355 SCI. MAG. 698, 698–99 (2017).
75. Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 381; Sherkow, supra note 70, at 668–69.
76. Sherkow, supra note 70, at 669.
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employer is 4.2 years,77 and since many Americans receive their
insurance through their employers, they may switch insurers at that
rate as well. Other individuals may switch between different specific
insurance plans, switch plan options within their employer offerings at
open enrollment, or shift from one type of insurance, such as
Medicaid, to another, such as a private individual plan. Indeed, it is
estimated that the average person stays with their medical insurance
provider for “less than 6 years.”78 Given the distinct possibility that a
current policyholder will no longer be a customer in a few years, a
private insurer has little incentive to invest in treatments with longterm benefits but immediate one-time costs in the hundreds of
thousands of dollars.79
Second, insurers may be less likely to cover therapies because
there is a lack of evidence that the treatments will be successful long
term.80 Gene-editing treatments come into the market with the
promise and hope of lasting cures, but the technology is new enough
that developers have not gathered data on a full generation of
patients undergoing the treatment. Additionally, given the one-anddone nature of the treatment, there is not an option to discontinue
treatment that proves to be ineffective for the patient, as is the case
for other expensive, but more long-term, treatments.81 The
regulatory-approval process focuses on safety and analytical and
clinical validity; however, to get approval, it is not necessary to
demonstrate clinical utility.82 Thus, a treatment can enter the market
as a safe product but run into barriers of reimbursement as insurers
are wary of paying for untested technology.83 Without
77. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2018 (Sept. 20,
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KGY9-6CZ6].
78. Evans, supra note 10, at 2671.
79. This is analogous to a situation where an insurer has little incentive to pay for an
expensive preventive treatment because it would likely not be the insurance company
paying for the treatment for any potential developed symptoms. Anya E.R. Prince,
Prevention for Those Who Can Pay: Insurance Reimbursement of Genetic-Based
Preventive Interventions in the Liminal State Between Health and Disease, 2 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 365, 373–74 (2015).
80. Sherkow, supra note 70, at 668.
81. Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 384.
82. Lori Knowles, Westerly Luth & Tania Bubela, Paving the Road to Personalized
Medicine: Recommendations on Regulatory, Intellectual Property and Reimbursement
Challenges, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 453, 498 (2017).
83. This is a familiar problem with new technologies. For example, multigene panel
testing is increasingly being offered to patients with the promise that it is cheaper to test
many genes at once rather than to test each individually. However, insurers have been
slow to adopt coverage for these tests due to the lack of data on clinical utility. See, e.g.,
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reimbursement, treatments are more likely to go the way of Glybera
and fail before ever really making it onto the market, despite crossing
necessary regulatory hurdles and spending the initial research and
development costs.84
Third, even if insurers are interested in and willing to cover geneediting treatments, the reimbursement system may be overwhelmed
by the upfront high cost of treatments.85 This is a foreseeable problem
as the “ever-growing development pipeline of gene therapies on the
horizon” begins to enter the market.86 Relatively conservative
estimates of uptake of gene therapy show the impact of cost on the
insurance system:
Even if gene therapies are developed to treat only one in ten
patients with a genetic condition—approximately 1% of the
total US population—the cumulative budget impact at that
price could rise to US$3 trillion, as much as is currently spent in
a year on all health care in the USA.87
Given that insurers may not be driven to cover these treatments
or may be unable to afford them, the treatment developers will likely
be motivated to find creative ways to obtain reimbursement.
Kymriah’s introduction into the U.S. market provides an example of
the developer’s willingness to think creatively about potential
payment models. On the same day the FDA approved Kymriah,
priced at $475,000, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) announced that it would work with stakeholders to explore
“innovative payment arrangements.”88 The goal of innovating would

Julia R. Trosman et al., Payer Coverage for Hereditary Cancer Panels: Barriers,
Opportunities, and Implications for the Precision Medicine Initiative, 15 J. NAT’L
COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK 219, 220 (2017).
84. Louis P. Garrison Jr. et al., Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements—
Good Practices for Design, Implementation, and Evaluation: Report of the ISPOR Good
Practices for Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements Task Force, 16 VALUE
HEALTH 703, 704 (2013) [hereinafter Garrison et al., Performance-Based] (“If payers are
reluctant to adopt, manufacturers face the risk of reduced revenue for a product they
regard as delivering value.”); see also Szymon Jarosławski & Mondher Toumi, Market
Access Agreements for Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Diversity of Approaches and
Underlying Concepts, 11 BMC HEALTH SERVICES RES., no. 259, Oct. 8, 2011, at 1, 1.
85. E. Hanna et al., Funding Breakthrough Therapies: A Systematic Review and
Recommendation, 122 HEALTH POL’Y 217, 225–26 (2018).
86. Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 382.
87. Hampson et al., supra note 8, at 18.
88. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS: Innovative
Treatments Call for Innovative Payment Models & Arrangements (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-innovative-treatments-call-innovativepayment-models-and-arrangements [https://perma.cc/TW42-QD3X].
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be to help pay for treatments that provide high patient value with a
high one-time cost.89 Indeed, CMS has been a driver of exploring
alternative payment structures as part of a broader increased focus on
value-based medicine in lieu of fee-for-service care.90 Beyond just
CMS, however, many different innovative pricing models have been
introduced or suggested in the United States and internationally.91
These pricing models range from financial agreements (such as
discounts) to health-outcomes-based agreements (such as pay for
performance).92 The models have been introduced across a wide
variety of drugs and treatments but, in anticipation of the costs of
gene therapy and gene editing, a number of these new pricing models
have been suggested to ease the burden of covering gene-editing
technologies.93
B.

Innovative Payment Models

The goals of different payment schemes can be broadly
categorized as lowering the costs of the therapy and expanding the
insurance pool.94 Lowering costs will increase the likelihood that
insurers will cover the treatment and that individuals can access the
treatment. Absent lowering costs, expanding the pool spreads the
high cost of care across a broader group, making it easier for
insurance companies to absorb the cost into the system and,
therefore, more likely that they will opt for coverage. As discussed
above, sometimes insurers loathe covering expensive one-off
treatment since the policyholder may not be a customer in a couple
years.95 Spreading the risk of requests for high-cost gene-therapy
coverage across a broader risk pool limits the impetus for insurers to
avoid the difficulty associated with paying for coverage for
policyholders possibly in transition. Three alternative payment
structures—pay for performance, indication-based pricing, and
discounts—primarily aim to lower the cost paid to the developer for
the treatment.96 Annuities and reinsurance, on the other hand,
primarily seek to spread the risk either temporally or across people
and policies.97
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Hanna et al., supra note 85, at 218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra Section II.B.
Hanna et al., supra note 85, at 228.
Id.
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This section discusses the five alternative payment structures
mentioned above that have been implemented, discussed, or
recommended in the context of expensive gene-therapy treatments:
(1) pay for performance, (2) indication-based pricing, (3) discounts,
(4) annuity payments, and (5) reinsurance. For example, the Institute
for Clinical and Economic Review (“ICER”) identified these
alternative structures as options for use in gene therapy at the 2016
ICER Membership Policy Summit.98 This summit brought together
representatives, including drug manufacturers, pharmacy benefit
management, and insurers, to discuss various payment options.99
Since then, there have been efforts to implement most of these
alternative structures within a gene-therapy context, as will be
discussed more below.100
1. Pay for Performance
Pay-for-performance models, also called outcome-based or risksharing models,101 require the patient, the payer, or both to pay the
full cost of the treatment only if it is effective—thereby lowering the
cost of the treatment for some individuals and for payers in the
aggregate, while keeping the overarching list price high.102 There are
several goals to setting up such a system. For one, insurers may be
more likely to agree to cover a treatment when they are only paying
for value.103 From a societal perspective, pay for performance would
also be beneficial because it will ideally spur the collection of
evidence of effectiveness and encourage the pharmaceutical
community (or in this case the gene-therapy community) to focus on
marketing to those populations where the drug or treatment is likely
to be most effective. This raises two primary questions: What would
the ongoing payment mechanism look like, and how will effectiveness
be measured?104
98. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 8–10; Hampson et al., supra note 8, at 20.
99. See ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 1.
100. See infra Sections IV.B.1–5.
101. Peter J. Neumann et al., Risk-Sharing Arrangements that Link Payment for Drugs
to Health Outcomes Are Proving Hard to Implement, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2329, 2329 (2011).
102. See Jarosławski & Toumi, supra note 84, at 2.
103. ELIZABETH SEELEY & AARON S. KESSELHEIM, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
OUTCOMES-BASED PHARMACEUTICAL CONTRACTS: AN ANSWER TO HIGH U.S. DRUG
SPENDING? 1–2 (2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/
___media_files_publications_issue_brief_2017_sep_seeley_outcomes_based_pharma_contr
acts_ib.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2ER-8UD8]; Neumann et al., supra note 101, at 2330.
104. These are by no means the only questions that must get sorted before such
payment schemes can be successful. For example, other potential issues include the
absence of suitable data infrastructure and high implementation costs. SEELEY &
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Pay-for-performance models can either be set up where insurers
buy the full cost of treatment up front and then receive rebates if the
treatment is not effective long term.105 Alternatively, insurers could
pay an initial amount and have some form of continuing payments for
as long as the treatments work.106 One of the most difficult parts of
this scenario is that it creates a long-term payment relationship
between a treatment developer, the payer, and the patient for a single
event that has already occurred. Thus, potential complications arise if
and when the patient changes insurance companies.107 Does the new
insurer now accept responsibility to pay for the remaining costs of a
treatment they did not initially approve or cover? Does the old
insurance company continue to have an obligation to cover costs for a
patient who is no longer their policyholder? If the insurer is expecting
rebates, how do they continue to track the health of a patient who is
no longer their policyholder? It is perhaps no wonder that many
examples of implemented pay-for-performance contracts have arisen
in countries with single-payer systems, where this problem of
switching insurance plans does not arise.108
A rebate may be the best way to address this scenario, especially
if the treatment developer assesses performance across a patient
population rather than for a specific patient.109 Thus, the relevant data
would be the aggregate success of a treatment rather than data
particular to one patient—a situation that would also encourage

KESSELHEIM, supra note 103, at 4–5; Garrison et al., Private Sector, supra note 71, at 634;
Neumann et al., supra note 101, at 2329.
105. Rachel Sachs, Nicholas Bagley & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Innovative Contracting
for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 10
(2017).
106. Id.
107. See Orkin & Reilly, supra note 43, at 1061; Ted Slocomb et al., New Payment and
Financing Models for Curative Regenerative Medicines, IN VIVO, July–Aug. 2017, at 1, 3–4,
https://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Articles/ARM_Curative_Regenerative_
IV1707_LRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX52-KFBX].
108. See, e.g., Garrison et al., Private Sector, supra note 71, at 633 (noting that of the
148 worldwide risk-sharing agreements, including pay-for-performance agreements, as of
2013, only eighteen were from the United States and only seven were implemented in the
private sector). The authors also note that most of these arrangements were implemented
in single-payer systems in Europe, Canada, and Australia. Id.; see also Josh J. Carlson,
Louis P. Garrison, Jr. & Sean D. Sullivan, Commentary, Paying for Outcomes: Innovative
Coverage and Reimbursement Schemes for Pharmaceuticals, 15 J. MANAGED CARE
PHARMACY 683, 685–86 (2009) (highlighting other potential barriers to implementation in
the United States that could also be present in single-payer systems); Neumann et al.,
supra note 101, at 2332 (noting that another benefit of the European systems is that they
have more leverage to contract such plans).
109. Sachs et al., supra note 105, at 12.
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broad data collection on effectiveness of the treatment overall.110
Another potential solution is to place the initial payment into a type
of escrow account until the success of the drug has been
determined.111 If it does not succeed, as defined by the parties, the
payer will get the money back from escrow.112 If it does succeed, the
manufacturer will get the money.113 Although this would address
many of the back-end challenges of long-term follow-up, it would not
ease the initial payments made by payers and therefore may still lead
payers to opt not to cover the expensive treatment due to high
upfront costs.
As discussed previously, the pay-for-performance model has
already made a brief debut in the U.S. gene-therapy markets when
CMS announced its willingness to develop an alternative payment
model for Kymriah.114 This first attempt showed little promise, since
less than one year after the initial announcement CMS ended
negotiations over the payment deal, ostensibly out of concern that
Novartis, the maker of Kymriah, had too much influence over the
negotiations.115
This raises the second major question of a pay-for-performance
model: How and when should effectiveness be measured?116 During
the CMS negotiations for Kymriah, Novartis advocated for an
assessment of effectiveness one month after treatment.117 Others
argued that this was too short a time period to properly measure
success or to determine if there will be any complications or adverse

110. Garrison et al., Performance-Based, supra note 84, at 709, 711–13.
(discussing use of performance-linked reimbursement at the patient level as opposed to
part of broader research).
111. Of course, as discussed later, what counts as “success” must be determined ahead
of time. See infra text accompanying notes 116–24.
112. Hanna et al., supra note 85, at 227.
113. This was discussed in the context of coverage with evidence development but is
equally applicable to pay for performance. Id.
114. Sarah Karlin-Smith & David Pittman, CMS Quit Test of Pricey Cancer Treatment
Amid Concerns Over Industry Role, POLITICO (July 9, 2018, 3:22 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/cms-quit-test-of-pricey-cancer-treatment-amidconcerns-over-industry-role-674086 [https://perma.cc/2FFA-C2RN].
115. Id. Private payers may still be exploring these types of payment arrangements for
their policies with Novartis.
116. See, e.g., Garrison et al., Private Sector, supra note 71, at 635–36.
117. Rachel Sachs, CMS Abandonment of Outcomes-Based Payment Deal with
Novartis Is a Missed Opportunity, HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH BLOG
(July 12, 2018), https://blogs-test.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2018/07/12/what-does-cmswithdrawal-of-its-kymriah-deal-mean-for-cms-and-outcomes-based-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/
SX8D-QM32].
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events.118 There is a balance, however, to selecting an appropriate
time frame to measure the outcomes of a treatment. Shorter time
frames are generally recommended for pay-for-performance systems,
since longer time frames increase the administrative costs and
complexity of implementing the model.119 Of course, too short of time
frames may not convince payers that a treatment is truly successful
and therefore will not be successful in bringing gene therapies to
market.
To be successful, pay for performance should incorporate
relatively easy-to-measure outcomes.120 These should be “objective,
clearly defined, reproducible, . . . difficult to manipulate,” and not
influenced by other situations or patient characteristics.121 Gene
therapy specifically, however, may not have easy-to-measure
outcomes available. As one commentary discussing the challenges of
alternative payment models describes:
[U]nlike hypertension whereby reduction in blood pressure is
an easy to understand end point for an antihypertensive and
could be used in a pay-for-performance . . . , there are
difficulties in demonstrating outcomes via hard end points in
genetic diseases, even on a patient level as population studies
are difficult given the small numbers, and there is also the
additional time lag (sometimes years) between administration
and any apparent clinical benefit.122
Additionally, since each gene-therapy treatment is unique, the
outcomes assessment will need to be renegotiated between
developers and payers for each new treatment.123
These complications of negotiating pay-for-performance models
have led to fairly low and stagnant uptake of these types of
agreements in the private sector across a variety of treatments.124
Gene therapy has increased calls for implementation of pay for
performance in this area, but it remains to be seen whether the
private sector will increasingly negotiate these arrangements.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Neumann et al., supra note 101, at 2333.
Id.
Id.
Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 385.
Id. at 386.
Garrison et al., Private Sector, supra note 71, at 632.
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2. Indication-Based Pricing
When a drug is introduced into the market, it may be prescribed
for a number of different conditions, whether on or off label.125
However, the drug is likely to have different levels of effectiveness,
especially when the conditions, or indications, are quite different.126
This variable effectiveness across different patient populations is
behind original calls for indication-based pricing. Under indicationbased pricing, the most effective uses of the treatment cost more than
those uses that have less effectiveness.127 The economic motivations
for patients paying more for those treatments that provide higher
value is that, by successfully segmenting patient markets, access to the
drug will increase across patient populations.128 The lower costs for
some segments of the population will make it more likely that they
can access treatment.129 This method, however, has been criticized,
with those against the practice arguing that this will not lower costs
but increase health-care spending through greater utilization of less
effective treatments.130
Indication-based pricing was utilized for Kymriah in the genetherapy context.131 About a year after its initial approval, the FDA
gave Kymriah a new approval, expanding it from a therapy intended
only for young adults and children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia
to a treatment for large B-cell lymphoma in all patients, including
adults.132 The cost of the same drug for this different patient
population is $373,000, compared to the original $475,000.133 Whether
this type of pricing will increase access to helpful treatment or simply
increase utilization of less effective treatments remains to be seen.
3. Discounts
A third way to lower the cost of treatments is, well, to lower the
cost of treatments. Drug manufacturers have utilized discounts or
125. Sachs et al., supra note 105, at 9.
126. Id.
127. Amitabh Chandra & Craig Garthwaite, The Economics of Indication-Based Drug
Pricing, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 103 (2017).
128. See id. at 104.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 103–04.
131. See Lydia Ramsey, A Cutting-Edge New Cancer Treatment Has Two Different
Price Tags, and It Could Be the Future of How We Pay for Drugs, BUS. INSIDER (May 7,
2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/indication-based-pricing-for-novartiscar-t-cell-therapy-kymriah-2018-5 [https://perma.cc/7NG5-Z5NL (dark archive)].
132. See id.
133. Id.
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rebates as a way to increase uptake of a pharmaceutical product by
charging a lower price tag than the list price of the good.134 In the
context of gene-therapy treatments, developers may opt to provide
discounts to certain patients or a specific insurance plan in order to
encourage uptake and coverage.135 Discounts can be beneficial
because they lower the cost of the treatment—thus minimizing a
significant barrier to access.136 Additionally, payers generally prefer
discounts because they are much simpler to manage than the complex
administration of other systems like pay for performance.137
However, the implementation of discounts may still create
problems for two reasons. First, discounts have been critiqued
because, unlike pay-for-performance and indication-based pricing,
the decreased costs are not associated with the value the treatment or
drug carries.138 Thus, discounts do little to motivate treatment
developers to improve the efficiency of their product.
Second, for the extremely large payments of gene therapies,
discounts are likely to be negotiated on a case-by-case—or at least a
health-plan-by-health-plan—basis, if provided at all. Case-by-case
negotiations place a lot of discretion with the developers to control
who has access to the treatment. For example, StatNews recently
published a story about two siblings in the Amish community who
carry the specific gene mutation that Luxturna is approved to treat.139
The catch is that the Amish community pools resources to pay for the
community’s health needs—it does not have private insurance
policies to cover even a portion of the expenses of gene therapy.140
Additionally, since there are two children who would need the
treatment in the community, the total cost would be $1.7 million.141
The families are working with the maker of Luxturna, Spark
134. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 30–31.
135. Id. at 29 (highlighting the goal to meet optimal levels of coverage).
136. Id. at 30–31 (noting that the goal of discounts is to lower the individual level costs
to within the ability to pay).
137. See Jarosławski & Toumi, supra note 84, at 5–6 (citing the statement of the chair
of the U.K. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (“NICE”) that “a simple
discount may eliminate the need to put in place complicated schemes that require
substantial management input”); see also Garrison et al., Private Sector, supra note 71, at
634 (identifying barriers to implementing alternative payment schemes linked to outcome,
like pay for performance).
138. Neumann et al., supra note 101, at 2332–33.
139. See Eric Boodman, The Amish Pool Resources for Their Medical Care. A BudgetBusting Gene Therapy Puts Them in a Bind, STAT (May 8, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/08/luxturna-gene-therapy-price-amish [https://perma.cc/
M792-JFBY].
140. See id.
141. See id.
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Therapeutics, to negotiate a discount for the drug, similar to that an
insurer might get; although at the time of the story, the company was
not willing to give any discounts.142 Here again, as with pay-forperformance schemes, a larger payer or single-payer may be better
able to negotiate discounts for their policyholders than individuals
themselves or a smaller health plan.143
4. Reinsurance
Pay-for-performance pricing, indication-based pricing, and
discounts are all alternative payment systems that seek to lower the
cost of treatment for at least some segment of the population—those
whose treatment was ineffective, those disease or indication groups
experiencing different treatment effectiveness, and those whose
payers have negotiated reduced rates, respectively. Other alternative
payment models seek to spread the cost across a broader risk pool. By
spreading the risk of a high payment across a larger insurance pool,
payers minimize the potential harm of having several high-cost
payments within one plan year. For example, an insurance pool of ten
people is much more likely to be impacted if one needs an $800,000
treatment than an insurance pool of one hundred. Therefore,
insurance companies can try to grow their risk pools—generally, they
aim to increase the number of relatively healthy policyholders in their
risk pool.144
Alternatively, insurers can seek reinsurance as another way to
spread their risk even without contracting with more policyholders.
Reinsurance is effectively an insurance policy for the insurance
company, which covers the risk of a high one-time payment.145 In this
way, individual companies are protected against an unanticipated
number of high payouts and spread the cost across what is effectively
pooled risk for insurance companies.146 As a way to pool risk across
insurances, reinsurance is an especially attractive solution in
countries, like the United States, that have a fragmented health-care
system.147 Reinsurance, however, is not necessarily expected to
decrease costs since it reduces incentives for drug developers to lower

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id.
See id.
See ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 31.
See id.
See id.
Hanna et al., supra note 85, at 227.
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prices.148 Additionally, some reinsurers have explicitly begun to
exclude gene therapies from their coverage.149
5. Annuity Payments
Another proposed solution to high insurance payouts is to set up
reimbursement as a series of payments over time, rather than require
the full cost all at once.150 Called annuity payments, or alternatively
amortization, these models would tend to make costs for an insurance
company more consistent and less random.151 Such models have also
been analogized to a home mortgage system—rather than pay for the
good up front and reap the benefit for years to come, homeowners
instead enter into mortgages to set costs over time and defray the
initial up-front cost.152 Whereas reinsurance spreads cost across a
greater number of people, annuity payments spread cost temporally.
Annuity payments require an up-front loan that the patient or
insurer then pays off over time—much like a mortgage company
loaning the initial money to pay for the house.153 This loan could come
from the treatment developer, a third-party financer, or a consumer
loan, but some also suggest that it could be done through an initial
government-issued loan.154 The annuity payment model can also be
combined with a pay-for-performance model, where the annuity
payments only continue as long as the treatment remains effective for
the patient.155 Of course, similar, if not more complex, problems arise
due to the long-term payment relationship between insurer, drug
manufacturer, and patient. Questions of what happens when a patient
switches insurance plans remain an issue,156 along with new questions
of what happens if the payments go into default and what implications
this would have to the overall cost of the system.157

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 32; SCOTT GOTTLIEB & TANISHA CARINO, AEI
RESEARCH, ESTABLISHING NEW PAYMENT PROVISIONS FOR THE HIGH COST OF
CURING DISEASE 4 (2014), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-establishing-newpayment-provisions-for-the-high-cost-of-curing-disease_154058134931.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
9ZCZ-B9YK]; Slocomb et al., supra note 107, at 3.
151. See Slocomb et al., supra note 107, at 3.
152. Sachs et al., supra note 105, at 14.
153. Id.
154. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 32–33; Hampson et al., supra note 8, at 21–22.
155. See Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 385; Orkin & Reilly, supra note 43, at
1061.
156. See Carr & Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 385.
157. Sachs et al., supra note 105, at 14.
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Additionally, while annuities may help to bring gene therapies
onto the market, they essentially push health-care costs down the
road without effectively lowering costs.158 This may strain health-care
budgets in the future and continue to threaten the health-care
systems.159
C.

Patient Issues

Even if innovative pricing models are adopted and work to lower
the cost of new gene-editing treatments or to spread the expense
temporally or across a broader risk pool, cost may still be an issue for
patients—a perennial problem in our broken health-care system. For
example, even with insurance coverage, out-of-pocket costs for geneediting treatments may be prohibitive for many individuals.
Additionally, in a society where there is inequitable access to health
insurance itself, there will be many people for whom reimbursement
policies are irrelevant, and this problem will be magnified if changes
to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) remove protections for
preexisting conditions. Thus, it is foreseeable that cost will be a
significant barrier to access as somatic gene-editing therapies enter
clinical care.160
1. Out-of-Pocket Expenses
For any large-cost treatment, out-of-pocket costs, such as co-pays
and coinsurance, can prevent individuals from accessing care, even if
that care is covered in part by insurance.161 Indeed, even small co-pays
158. See Hanna et al., supra note 85, at 227.
159. Id.
160. Of course, we can expect that other health-care inequalities will lead to barriers to
access. For example, there is already a dearth of genetic services across the country,
especially in rural areas far from academic medical centers that generally handle genetic
services. See, e.g., Alice K. Hawkins & Michael R. Hayden, A Grand Challenge: Providing
Benefits of Clinical Genetics to Those in Need, 13 GENETICS MED. 197, 197 (2011). This
inequality can be further exacerbated with regard to gene-editing treatment since the
FDA sometimes grants approval contingent on the treatment being provided by
specifically trained facilities or doctors. See, e.g., FDA Kymriah Press Release, supra note
17. This has also been recommended in the gene-therapy arena where treatments may
need to be given at specific hospitals or treatment facilities. Hampson et al., supra note 8,
at 19. Additionally, problematic racial disparities regarding referral to genetic testing
create differential outcomes across patients of different ethnicities and races. See, e.g.,
Molly Quinn & Victor Fujimoto, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Assisted Reproductive
Technology Access and Outcomes, 105 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1119, 1119 (2016).
161. See, e.g., Preventive Services Covered by Private Health Plans Under the
Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.kff.org/
health-reform/fact-sheet/preventive-services-covered-by-private-health-plans/ [https://perma.cc/
G3VJ-DTK6].
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can be a barrier to care—one of the reasons why the ACA included
preventive care free of all out-of-pocket costs to policyholders.162
High out-of-pocket costs can lead to disparities in access to care.163
For example, in part due to the high costs associated with in vitro
fertilization (“IVF”), minorities and persons of low-to-middle
socioeconomic status are less likely to get care for infertility.164 It is
especially important to continue to consider out-of-pocket costs and
barriers of access for patients because society could implement
several innovative pricing systems described above but still not
improve equitable access since innovative models will not help those
that choose not to undergo a treatment due to out-of-pocket costs.165
Out-of-pocket expenses are also a problem for those who do not
have insurance coverage. As the example of the Amish seeking
discounts for Luxturna highlights, individuals and even communities
without insurance reimbursement can find the high costs of genetherapy treatments a significant barrier.166 Even for those with
insurance coverage, getting access to high-cost gene-therapy
treatments can be difficult.167 High out-of-pocket costs could prevent
a patient from getting care or can necessitate finding other sources of
money, such as from a crowdfunding website like GoFundMe.168
Additionally, until therapies are covered by existing insurance
policies, the new treatments will essentially have to be covered via
self-pay.169
2. Preexisting Conditions
Currently, individuals with genetic conditions are protected
against discrimination in access to health insurance principally by two
laws—the ACA and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(“GINA”). GINA prohibits health insurers from denying an
individual health insurance based on genetic information, including
genetic test results and family medical history.170 One catch, however,
162. See id.
163. See id. fig.1.
164. See Quinn & Fujimoto, supra note 160, at 1120.
165. SEELEY & KESSELHEIM, supra note 103, at 5.
166. See Boodman, supra note 139.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Two Sick Children and a $1.5 Million Bill: One
Family’s Race for a Gene Therapy Cure, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612259/two-sick-children-and-a-15-million-bill-onefamilys-race-for-a-gene-therapy-cure/ [https://perma.cc/J2BV-W2DV].
170. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)
(2012).
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is that GINA’s protections do not cover manifested symptoms, even if
they have an underlying genetic cause.171 Enter the ACA, which
prohibits health insurers from considering preexisting conditions and
symptoms when determining insurance coverage and setting rates.172
Protection for preexisting conditions is simultaneously one of the
most popular provisions of the law and one of the most endangered.173
For example, currently the Trump administration has declined to
defend the ACA in an ongoing lawsuit that argues that the
preexisting condition protections are unconstitutional.174 Given
existing political threats to the preexisting condition protections of
the ACA, it is worth noting how genetics in general and gene-editing
treatments in particular may challenge the scope of protections
provided by GINA were the ACA’s protections to disappear.
If the preexisting condition clause of the ACA no longer applies,
then GINA will return as the primary health insurance protection for
individuals with gene-based risks and predispositions. However, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear distinction between a
predisposition and a disease. For example, if a patient has a variant in
a Lynch-Syndrome-associated gene that indicates that he or she is at
increased risk for colon cancer, this alone would be protected genetic
information.175 If the same patient developed colon cancer, this would
be a manifested condition.176 But does the initiation of preventive
measures, like screening for what doctors and genetic counselors
identify as a “cancer predisposition syndrome,” indicate that what
was a predisposition is now a disease? Does finding a polyp qualify as
manifesting? Virtually every genetic condition not fully penetrant at
birth poses some variant of this conundrum.
GINA itself does not define “manifestation” of disease.177
However, GINA’s regulations related to health insurance state that a
disease is manifest when
an individual has been or could reasonably be diagnosed with
the disease, disorder, or pathological condition by a health care
171. See Anya E.R. Prince & Benjamin E. Berkman, When Does an Illness Begin:
Genetic Discrimination and Disease Manifestation, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 655, 655 (2012).
172. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a), (d) (2012).
173. See Julie Rovner & Julie Appleby, Administration Challenges ACA’s Preexisting
Conditions Protection in Court, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 8, 2018),
https://khn.org/news/administration-challenges-acas-preexisting-conditions-protection-in-court
[https://perma.cc/8PXL-YXCZ].
174. See id.
175. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-3T(a)(6)(ii) ex. 2 (2018).
176. Id. § 54.9802-3T(a)(6)(ii) ex. 3.
177. See Prince & Berkman, supra note 171, at 655.
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professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field
of medicine involved. For purposes of this section, a disease,
disorder, or pathological condition is not manifest if a diagnosis
is based principally on genetic information.178
Gene-editing therapies will likely continue to blur the bounds
between genotype and phenotype—that is, between a person’s genes
and their actual self: the collection of features, characteristics, and
tendencies that presents itself to the world. Indeed, with gene editing,
it is the genotype itself that is the manifestation of disease being
treated, sometimes in advance of any symptomology at all. Many
potential gene-therapy targets, such as metabolic diseases, are
progressive and show effects over time, although the genetic variant
responsible for the disease could be identified in utero or at birth. In
many scenarios, presymptomatic treatment may be one of the
advantages of gene therapy, which could allow us to act before the
disease inflicts damage that cannot be undone. For this reason, we
emphasize the second part of the definition of manifestation in the
regulations—that if a diagnosis is based principally on genetic
information it is not considered a manifest condition. If this
protection is lost (and without the ACA protections), and if clinical
genetic testing and preventive gene-editing therapies become more
mainstream, some people would be at risk of losing their health
insurance simply because of their genetic makeup.
Unfortunately, if the ACA protections are repealed, many
individuals who could benefit from gene-therapy or gene-editing
treatments could be denied coverage based on existing symptoms.179
For example, without ACA protection, if an individual has been
experiencing vision loss, a new individual insurance policy could deny
the patient health insurance based on the preexisting condition or
refuse to cover the cost of Luxturna due to a preexisting condition
exclusion. While other insurance, such as Medicaid, may be an option
(assuming that state Medicaid had opted to cover the expensive
treatment), this would push more patients needing extremely
expensive medical care into already stretched public systems rather
than pooling risks throughout private and public insurance. Ideally, of
course, both the protections of the ACA and GINA should remain in
place in order to have continuity of protection across the murky
boundary between genotype and phenotype.
178. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-3T(a)(6)(i) (2018). The EEOC regulations in the employment
context include a similar definition of manifestation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(g) (2018).
179. See Sherkow, supra note 70, at 669.
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IV. ACCESS AND DISPARITIES
Disparities in access to care are not unique to gene therapy; there
is nothing new about health-care disparities. Other health-care
treatments raise concerns related to high costs and one-time
treatments. For example, Sovaldi, a treatment for Hepatitis C, costs
as much as $84,000 for a twelve-week dose.180 However, it is still
important to examine these issues in the gene-therapy space as
treatments grow, given the social implications of having some able to
access a cure and others left without the possibility to pay for desired
treatment.
The introduction of a powerful new class of high-priced therapies
with the potential to considerably reduce the burden of inherited
disease brings the issue to a new level. Obviously, anytime an
individual is denied access to care it is lamentable. Systemically, it
translates into something broader: an issue of social justice.
We often see diseases where incidence as well as outcome are
related to poverty, from cardiovascular disease to tropical diseases
such as dengue fever.181 Systematic analysis has shown that diseases
that occur primarily in low-income populations are less likely to be
the focus of research and pharmaceutical development.182 Examples
like malaria and tuberculosis generally expose differences between
developing and developed nations; gene therapy has the potential to
divide the population of a given nation into at-risk and not-at-risk
subcultures. How this affects the division of health and community
resources remains to be seen, but an ebbing of empathic or selfinterest-based motivation for controlling diseases is one possible
result.
As a policy statement from the American Society of Human
Genetics (“ASHG”) puts it,
Unequal access and cultural differences affecting uptake could
create large differences in the relative incidence of a given
condition by region, ethnic group, or socioeconomic status.
180. Olga Khazan, The True Cost of an Expensive Medication, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/an-expensive-medications-humancost/407299/ [https://perma.cc/T674-XURG].
181. Peter J. Hotez, Kristy O. Murray & Pierre Buekens, The Gulf Coast: A New
American Underbelly of Tropical Diseases and Poverty, 8 PLOS, e2760, May 15, 2014, at 1,
1; Sanjat Kanjilal et al., Socioeconomic Status and Trends in Disparities in 4 Major Risk
Factors for Cardiovascular Disease Among US Adults, 1971-2002, 166 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2348, 2348 (2006).
182. Patrice Trouiller, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market
and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 2188 (2002).
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Genetic disease, once a universal common denominator, could
instead become an artifact of class, geographic location, and
culture.183
In this instance the ASHG working group was discussing changes to
the human germline—eggs, sperm, or embryos184—but the point is
relevant to somatic treatments as well. A treatment that is an
effective cure for some and not others could adversely affect our
willingness to find funds for resources and care to help those who
remain affected, as well as funding for research into less glamorous
but more affordable conventional treatments.185
No one likes to imagine that there could be a lack of empathy for
individuals without access to care, but both health-care and research
dollars are finite and competitive. It is easier to imagine an empathy
deficit when the community-building aspect of our shared risk is no
longer in play. It has the potential to increase the sort of stigma often
discussed by advocates for disability rights who described how
affected individuals can be viewed as “other.”186 “Genetic disease has
always been our shared vulnerability. When one part of society can
opt out of risk, will they continue to feel the same obligation to
provide support and resources to those who remain [vulnerable]
. . . ?”187
This is not to say that everyone should undergo gene therapy—
there are some who may choose not to get this treatment for a myriad
of valid reasons.188 Nor is this necessarily where society’s limited
health-care dollars should be focused. However, as these technologies
are inevitably rolled into clinical care, there are problematic
implications if only those with independent funding are able to cure
disease. Currently, this lack of access affects only a handful of
individuals as somatic gene-therapy treatment reaches a small patient
population. However, as gene-therapy offerings grow, so too will the
impact for those left out of the system due to cost. Now, at the dawn
of gene therapy, is a ripe time to consider both access and cost.

183. Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 167, 172 (2017).
184. See id.
185. See id.; Laura Hercher, Innovations in Prenatal Testing and the Ghettoization of
Genetic Disease (July 5, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
186. Aisling de Paor & Peter Blanck, Precision Medicine and Advancing Genetic
Technologies—Disability and Human Rights Perspectives, 5 LAWS 1, 8 (2016).
187. Hercher, supra note 185.
188. Ormond et al., supra note 183, at 171.
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CONCLUSION
Gene therapy will never be the underlying cause of health-care
inequities; access to care is a systemic issue within our health-care
system. However, gene therapy threatens to exacerbate existing
disparities in substantial ways. Generally, though this may not be true
in every instance, there are three characteristics of gene therapy that
have social justice implications: they are extremely expensive as a
one-time cost, they are intended as a cure rather than a treatment or
risk-reducing measure, and they are specific to a given genotype.
Successful applications of gene therapy with limited access will not
just improve outcomes for individuals who receive the intervention
but essentially create a class of persons who are at risk for these
diseases and a class of persons who are not. And while success for the
early adopters who have insurance or can self-pay may pave the way
for others down the road, the individualized nature of gene therapy is
such that scale or practice may not radically bring the prices down, as
has often been the case with other innovations.
Our recommendation, therefore, is for the importance of
equitable access. Access can be improved either by increasing
reimbursement or decreasing costs, and greater equality of access will
no doubt require both. Because insurers are not incentivized to pay
for expensive one-time therapies under our current system, we will
need to consider a variety of alternative payment systems that lower
costs, reduce uncertainties relative to value, and create a broader pool
of shared risk.
The advent of successful gene therapy is a long-sought goal of
medical research and may prove to be a blessing for many families
affected by genetic disease. The economics of gene therapy, however,
are challenging and may reduce access for broad swaths of the
population. Without a commitment to ensuring access, gene therapy
may fail to live up to its potential. Individuals may be unable to pay
for treatment or denied it because their disease is too rare or their
prognosis is too uncertain to make gene therapy economically viable.
In consequence, we run the risk of creating a world of haves and
have-nots and that those who cannot find the means of obtaining
treatment face more in the way of stigma with less in the way of
resources and support. For all of these reasons, the success of gene
therapy must be considered as inextricable from issues of cost and
coverage.
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